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In recent years, the U.S. economy has surprised
observers by growing briskly, even as inﬂation has
remained quiescent. During 1996–99, for example,
U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at
4.2 percent annually, whereas inﬂation, measured by
the consumer price index, averaged only 2.3 percent.
This impressive performance of the economy reﬂects
in part an acceleration in recorded labor productivity.
After having averaged 1.4 percent per year from
1973 to 1995, output per hour in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector rose almost 2.6 percent from 1996 to
1999. This acceleration has allowed many ﬁrms to
increase output without experiencing signiﬁcant
increases in unit costs.
The most prominent explanation for the pickup
in productivity growth centers on new developments
in the high-technology sector—in particular, the pro-
liferation of computer and information technology.
Insofar as most of the recent technological advances
in this area are available to businesses worldwide, it
is natural to expect them to contribute to faster pro-
ductivity growth abroad as well.1
The availability of new technologies on a world-
wide basis need not, however, translate into an auto-
matic improvement in productivity performance.
An economy’s structure, institutions, and regula-
tions inﬂuence the rapidity with which technological
advances are adopted and the extent to which adop-
tion of these advances leads to heightened efﬁciency.
In this article we review the recent productivity
trends in foreign industrial countries to examine
whether they, too, are experiencing an improve-
ment comparable to that seen in the United States.
(In this study, we will not focus on the level of
productivity but, rather, on trends in the growth rate
of productivity.)
Our main ﬁnding is that, with only a few excep-
tions, labor productivity in foreign industrial coun-
tries does not appear to have accelerated in the latter
half of the 1990s. Thus, labor productivity in the
United States has changed from increasing less rap-
idly than that of most foreign industrial countries to
rising more rapidly. In this article, we also consider
factors that may account for this divergence in pro-
ductivity trends and discuss the extent to which this
difference is likely to persist.
Our conclusions need to be tempered, however, for
several reasons. First, there are signiﬁcant problems
in data comparability and availability (such as mea-
sures of capital). Moreover, much of the data are
published with a considerable delay. Difﬁcult concep-
tual issues, especially with respect to measurement of
the high-tech sector, make it difﬁcult to ascertain the
role of information technology as an engine of pro-
ductivity growth abroad. Also, because the sample
period is rather brief, the task of identifying a change
in trend productivity growth is complicated. On the
whole, these difﬁculties suggest that there is much
room for further work on this important topic.
DEFINING PRODUCTIVITY
Labor productivity—the output of workers per unit of
time—is a commonly used and straightforward mea-
sure of productivity (see box ‘‘Measures of Produc-
tivity’’). The growth rate of labor productivity is
approximately equal to the difference between the
growth rate of output and the growth rate of the
number of hours worked in the economy.
If output is produced by two factors, labor and
capital, then the growth of labor productivity, in turn,
depends upon the rate of ‘‘capital deepening’’ and the
1. For a more detailed discussion of the role of information
technology as an explanation for the recent pickup in U.S. productivity
growth, see Robert Gordon, ‘‘Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure
Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?’’ Journal of Economic
Perspectives (forthcoming); Alan Greenspan (remarks before the
New York Association for Business Economics, New York, N.Y.,
June 13, 2000), available on line at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000613.htm; Stephen Oliner and Daniel
Sichel, ‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information
Technology the Story?’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcom-
ing); and Dale W. Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh, ‘‘Raising the Speed
Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in the Information Age,’’ Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000, pp. 125–211.Measures of Productivity
Measures of productivity address the question of how much
output is produced, on average, by different factors of
production. The measure of productivity that is most com-
monly used is labor productivity because it is easy to
calculate and interpret: How much output is produced, on
average, by each unit of labor employed in production. We
express this idea as
LP = Y/L,
where LP is labor productivity, Y is the amount of output,
and L represents the amount of labor input. Because the
focus of our study is on productivity growth rather than the
level of productivity, we construct
lp = y − l,
where lowercase variables represent the growth rates of the
corresponding uppercase variables.
The growth of labor productivity, in turn, can be decom-
posed into the contributions of ‘‘capital deepening’’—the
growth of the capital–labor ratio—and the growth of ‘‘multi-
factor productivity’’—increases in productivity attributable
to technological advances or improvements in production
arrangements rather than to increases in factor inputs. Esti-
mating the contributions of capital deepening and multifac-
tor productivity to labor productivity growth requires mak-
ing assessments about the relative importance of capital,
labor, and multifactor productivity in the production pro-
cess. In particular, it requires specifying the form of the
production function:
Y = F(K, L, MFP),
where Y is the amount of output, and the expression F()
indicates the maximum amount of output that can be pro-
duced with given amounts of capital stock (K), labor, (L),
and multifactor productivity (MFP).1
Multifactor productivity growth is estimated as the differ-
ence between output growth and the growth of total factor
inputs—that is, the combined growth of the factors of
production: labor and capital. Total input growth can be
calculated as a weighted average of labor and capital
growth, with the marginal contributions of each of these
factors to output being used as the weights. In principle, the
marginal contribution of labor and capital to output depends
upon the form of the production function, and there is no
1. The role of land in the production process is generally ignored.
consensus on the exact speciﬁcation of this function. In
practice, a production function is often used that carries the
implication that the marginal contribution of each factor of
production is proportional to the share of total production
that it receives as compensation. Thus, total input growth
can be expressed as
q = wl • l + wk • k,
where q represents the combined growth of productive
inputs, wl is the weight of labor (usually the share of labor
compensation in total income), l is the growth rate of labor
input, wk is the weight of capital (usually the share of
capital compensation in total income), and k is the growth
rate of capital services, which we assume to be proportional
to the capital stock. Given the measure of overall input
growth, we deﬁne multifactor productivity growth as
mfp = y − q = y − [wl • l + wk • k],
where mfp is multifactor productivity growth, and y is the
growth of output. Thus, in this framework, any increase in
the growth of output in excess of the contribution of factor
inputs would be attributed to an increase in multifactor
productivity growth.
Rearranging the last equation slightly, output growth can
be expressed as a function of total factor input growth—the
weighted growth of labor and capital—and multifactor pro-
ductivity growth:
y=q+ mfp =[ wl • l + wk • k]+mfp.
Subtracting the growth of labor input, l, from both sides,
and keeping in mind that wl =1− wk, this relationship can
be further rearranged to decompose labor productivity
growth into two components: (1) (k − l) • wk, or the rate of
capital deepening adjusted by the contribution of capital to
the production process, and (2) mfp. Therefore, we have
y − l =( k − l) • wk + mfp.
If capital is relatively unimportant—that is, if the wk term is
small, then labor and multifactor productivity growth would
be virtually identical. Similarly, if the capital–labor ratio
remains essentially ﬁxed, then the growth rates of labor and
multifactor productivity would, again, be virtually identical.
If, however, capital is an important factor and the capital–
labor ratio is not ﬁxed, then labor and multifactor productiv-
ity growth need not move together.
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ing refers to a rise in the ratio of capital to labor, that
is, an increase in the amount of capital—machines,
structures, and infrastructure—available to workers.
For a given level of technology, capital deepening
raises workers’ ability to produce more output with
the same level of effort.2
Multifactor productivity growth refers to increases
in the productive capacity of the economy that are not
attributable to increases in the contributions of labor
and capital inputs. Increases in multifactor productiv-
ity may reﬂect advances in technology, but they may
also reﬂect any other developments that result in
greater efﬁciency, such as reorganization of tasks in a
ﬁrm or improvements in distribution channels used to
deliver goods and services. In either case, an accele-
ration in multifactor productivity allows labor to be
more productive even if the capital–labor ratio is
ﬁxed.
Measuring multifactor productivity requires ﬁrst
estimating the contribution of the factors of
production—capital and labor—to aggregate output.
Developing such a measure involves specifying the
economy’s production function, that is, the way
in which the economy transforms inputs of capital,
labor, and other potential factors into ﬁnal products.3
Conventional models of the production function sug-
gest that one reasonable means of measuring the
growth rate of total factor inputs is to add the growth
rate of labor to that of capital, each weighted by its
share in the value of production. The resulting sum
constitutes a measure of total input growth, which
can be subtracted from output growth to estimate
multifactor productivity growth. Thus, any increase
in the growth of output in excess of total input
growth would be attributed to an increase of multi-
factor productivity growth.
ESTIMATING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Estimating labor and multifactor productivity growth
for many countries requires data on a range of vari-
ables: output, employment, labor hours, capital, and
labor’s share of output. The choice of data series for
these variables is frequently constrained by the need
to obtain recent statistics that are comparable across
countries. For the United States, a complete and
conceptually consistent data set is available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).4 Similar data are
not available for many of the other countries in this
study.5
Because this study emphasizes comparisons across
countries, we supplement the BLS data for the United
States with data from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) on output,
labor, capital, and factor shares for seventeen indus-
trialized countries (including the United States). Most
of these data are collected for the business sector,
deﬁned as ‘‘the institutional sector whose primary
role is the production and sale of goods and ser-
vices.’’ 6 Hence, this data set nets out the general
government sector from our measures of output,
capital, and employment. Focusing on the business
sector avoids the potential for distortion in measures
of productivity due to the complexities involved in
assigning a market value to the associated ﬂow of
goods and services in the government sector. Also,
the OECD has standardized its deﬁnition of the busi-
ness sector across OECD countries to enhance the
comparability of the data.
2. Early studies on productivity include Robert Solow, ‘‘Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production Function,’’ Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, vol. 39 (August 1957), pp. 312–20; Edward F.
Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experience in Nine
Western Countries (The Brookings Institution, 1967); Simon Kuznets,
Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure
(Harvard University Press, 1971); Dale W. Jorgenson, Frank M.
Gollop, and Barbara M. Fraumeni, Productivity and U.S. Economic
Growth (Harvard University Press, 1987); and Dale W. Jorgenson,
‘‘Productivity and Economic Growth’’ in Ernst R. Berndt and Jack E.
Triplett, eds., Fifty Years of Economic Measurement: The Jubilee
of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (University
of Chicago Press, 1990).
More recent work includes Wolodar Lysko, ‘‘Manufacturing Multi-
factor Productivity in Three Countries,’’ Monthly Labor Review,
vol. 118 (July 1995), pp. 29–38; Chrys Dougherty and Dale W.
Jorgenson, ‘‘International Comparisons of the Sources of Economic
Growth,’’ American Economic Review (May 1996, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, 1996), pp. 25–29; Jeremy Greenwood, Zvi Hercowitz, and
Per Krusell, ‘‘Long-Run Implications of Investment-Speciﬁc Techno-
logical Change,’’ American Economic Review, vol. 87 (June 1997),
pp. 342–62; Stefano Scarpetta, Andrea Bassanini, Dirk Pilat, and Paul
Schreyer, ‘‘Economic Growth in the OECD Area: Recent Trends at
the Aggregate and Sectoral Level,’’ OECD Economics Department
Working Paper, no. 248; and Paul Schreyer, ‘‘The Contribution of
Information and Communication Technology to Output Growth: A
Study of the G-7 Countries,’’ OECD Science, Technology, and Indus-
try Working Paper, 2000/2 (OECD, 2000).
3. For surveys of the literature on production functions, see
Dale W. Jorgenson, ‘‘Econometric Methods for Modeling Producer
Behavior,’’ in Zvi Griliches and Michael D. Intriligator, Handbook
of Econometrics, vol. 3 (New York: North-Holland, 1986); and
Ulrich Kohli, Technology, Duality, and Foreign Trade: The GNP
Function Approach to Modeling Imports and Exports (University of
Michigan Press, 1991).
4. The BLS documents describing the multifactor productivity
series are available on line at http://www.bls.gov/mprhome.htm.
5. Complete and conceptually consistent data sets on labor and
multifactor productivity are also published for Australia and Canada
by their respective national statistical agencies.
6. For our purposes, the business sector data ideally would exclude
the ﬂow of services from owner-occupied dwellings in the household
sector. But the OECD deﬁnition of output includes the ﬂow of
services because of data limitations in various OECD countries.
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Table 1 reports average annual growth rates for busi-
ness sector GDP, labor hours, capital stock, and fac-
tor shares for selected periods: 1981–89, 1990–98,
1990–95, and 1996–98 for the seventeen industrial-
ized countries examined here.7 For the United States,
it includes the data both from the BLS and from the
OECD. It also shows ﬁgures for 1996–99, although
for the OECD data the calculations are based on
our own estimates of growth in hours per worker. By
and large, average growth rates for the 1996–98 and
1996–99 periods are quite similar in the BLS and the
OECD data sets.
GDP Growth
For the United States, based on BLS data, the average
annual growth rate of business GDP over 1996–98 is
4.9 percent (table 1), an increase of 2.3 percentage
points relative to the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and of
1.2 percentage points compared with the 1980s; the
OECD-based estimates of U.S. output growth are
quite similar to those of the BLS. For the foreign
industrial countries, Finland, Ireland, and Norway
show a greater increase in output growth over
1996–98 relative to either the ﬁrst half of the 1990s
or the 1980s. Other countries with a sizable increase
of growth in the late 1990s relative to the earlier
periods are Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and
Spain.
Labor Growth
The measure of labor that is used corresponds to
business sector employment adjusted by hours per
worker. Accounting for changes in hours worked,
as opposed to merely accounting for changes in the
number of employees, is important. First, from a
secular standpoint, the past two decades have seen a
decline in the number of hours worked per employee
in foreign industrial economies. Thus, abstracting
from the role of hours worked would overstate the
amount of growth of labor input and understate labor
productivity growth. Second, from a cyclical stand-
point, hours per worker change over time relative to
trend, as they provide ﬁrms with another means with
which to vary labor input.
The OECD measure of labor hours per worker is
for the overall economy instead of for the business
sector. Ideally, we would prefer a measure of hours
worked that corresponds to the OECD deﬁnition of
the business sector, but such series are not available.
However, the mismatch in the measure of hours is
probably more relevant for estimating the level of
productivity than for estimating the growth rate of
productivity, unless the government and business sec-
tors had signiﬁcant differences in the trends of hours
per worker.
For the United States, over 1996–98 the average
annual growth rate of labor hours, based on BLS data
for the nonfarm business sector, is 2.5 percent, which
is higher than the averages for the 1980s (2.1 percent)
and the early 1990s (1.0 percent).8 For the United
States, the OECD data follow a similar pattern, with
growth rates of 2.2 percent, 2.1 percent, and 1.4 per-
cent respectively.9
Turning to foreign countries, we ﬁnd that growth
in labor hours also picked up in 1996–98, relative to
the earlier periods, for many countries. Growth rates
of labor hours in Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and
the United Kingdom over 1996–98 are higher than
during 1990–95 and the 1980s. However, in many
industrial countries, hours worked declined between
the 1980s and the early 1990s.
Capital Growth
The OECD data use a gross capital stock measure
from which the full value of an asset is subtracted
when it is retired from production. For the United
States, the BLS-based measure of capital is a net
capital stock measure (that is, net of period-by-period
depreciation). With this measure, individual types of
capital are aggregated according to their marginal
product weights, as proxied by user costs for different
types of capital.10
For the United States, the average annual growth
rate of capital according to the BLS-based data over
1996–98 was 5.3 percent (table 1); this growth rate
7. We adopt the convention that the average annual growth rate for
output over, for example, 1996–98 refers to the mean growth rate from
the 1995 output level to the 1998 output level.
8. The BLS adjusts its measure of labor inputs for changes in labor
quality. Here we report the BLS measure without the labor-quality
adjustments.
9. Unlike the OECD, the BLS deﬁnition of the nonfarm business
sector excludes government enterprises such as the Postal Service.
10. The BLS-based data for capital are from Oliner and Sichel,
‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s.’’ They construct a
measure of capital through 1999 that is consistent with both BLS
methodology and the October 1999 comprehensive revisions of the
U.S. national income and product accounts. Since that paper was
ﬁnalized, the U.S. national accounts have been revised further. That
revision would raise the growth rate of capital slightly over 1996–99.
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1980s and the early 1990s. The OECD measure of
the growth of the U.S. capital stock follows much the
same pattern but is consistently below the growth
rate of U.S. capital in the BLS-based data. The main
reason for this difference in growth rates is that,
as noted, the BLS-based data aggregate individual
types of capital by their user costs. As a result, the
BLS data capture the effect of shifts in the com-
position of the capital stock toward types of capital
with higher productivities, such as those embodying
computer technology. The OECD data do not capture
such compositional shifts because they do not weight
different types of capital by their user costs. Although
we would prefer to use a series of capital for the
foreign industrial countries comparable to the BLS
1. Average growth rates for GDP, labor hours, and capital
stock, and labor’s share of GDP, in the Group of Seven
and other OECD countries, selected periods, 1981–99
Percent
Country and measure
of growth or share 1981–89 1990–98 1990–95 1996–98 1996–991
United States
BLS data 2
GDP ............. 3.64 3.30 2.52 4.86 4.84
Labor hours ...... 2.06 1.51 1.04 2.47 2.30
Capitalstock...... 4.36 3.87 3.16 5.30 5.59
Labor share ....... .68 .68 .68 .67 .67
OECD data
GDP ............. 3.44 3.13 2.41 4.55 4.43
Labor hours ...... 2.10 1.69 1.41 2.24 2.08
Capitalstock...... 2.90 2.40 1.90 3.41 3.70
Labor share ....... .67 .66 .66 .66 .66
Canada
GDP ............. 3.25 2.11 1.51 3.31 3.53
Labor hours ...... 1.81 .84 .17 2.19 2.59
Capitalstock...... 5.74 4.12 3.86 4.64 4.85
Labor share ....... .66 .70 .70 .70 .70
France
GDP ............. 2.40 1.70 1.30 2.50 2.53
Labor hours ...... − .95 − .42 − .94 .62 .91
Capitalstock...... 2.57 2.41 2.58 2.06 2.17
Labor share ....... .67 .61 .62 .61 .61
Germany 3
GDP ............. n.a. 1.68 1.62 1.77 1.72
Labor hours ...... n.a. − .43 − .62 − .18 − .41
Capitalstock...... n.a. 2.65 2.95 2.25 2.33
Labor share ....... n.a. .64 .66 .62 .62
Italy
GDP ............. 2.36 1.54 1.59 1.45 1.38
Labor hours ...... .04 − .51 − 1.09 .64 .71
Capitalstock...... 2.78 2.82 2.87 2.72 2.73
Labor share ....... .68 .64 .65 .62 .62
Japan
GDP ............. 4.09 1.84 2.15 1.21 1.31
Labor hours ...... .95 − .64 − .73 − .45 − .76
Capitalstock...... 5.84 4.46 4.88 3.62 3.31
Labor share ....... .77 .72 .72 .72 .72
United Kingdom
GDP ............. 3.54 2.61 2.37 3.08 2.78
Labor hours ...... .22 .88 .60 1.46 1.29
Capitalstock...... 1.69 2.73 2.64 2.92 3.10
Labor share ....... .69 .69 .70 .67 .69
Australia
GDP ............. 3.97 3.69 3.09 4.90 4.78
Labor hours ...... 2.50 1.31 1.29 1.33 1.61
Capitalstock...... 3.96 3.48 3.02 4.42 4.44
Labor share ....... .65 .62 .62 .62 .62
Note. In this and subsequent tables, the G-7 countries are listed ﬁrst.
1. Uses authors’ estimates for labor hours in 1999 for OECD data.
2. Data for the nonfarm business sector of the United States. Observations for
GDP and labor hours are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; data for
capital stock and labor share are for nonfarm business as computed by Oliner
and Sichel, ‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s.’’ They include
software in their measure of investment expenditure and extend the BLS data
beyond 1997.
3. Calculations for Germany use growth rates starting in 1992 to avoid the




of growth or share 1981–89 1990–98 1990–95 1996–98 1996–991
Belgium 4
GDP ............. 1.96 2.05 1.79 2.56 2.39
Labor hours ...... .61 .15 − .37 1.20 1.33
Capitalstock...... 2.84 3.14 3.26 2.90 2.93
Labor share ....... .64 .64 .64 .63 .63
Denmark 5
GDP ............. 2.01 2.97 2.82 3.27 2.74
Labor hours ...... − .06 .33 − .82 2.63 1.88
Capitalstock...... 3.02 2.91 2.69 3.35 3.42
Labor share ....... .69 .63 .63 .63 .63
Finland 6
GDP ............. 3.54 1.68 − .46 5.94 5.51
Labor hours ...... − .29 − 2.05 − 4.18 2.20 2.34
Capitalstock...... n.a. .35 − .14 .67 .85
Labor share ....... .71 .69 .71 .65 .64
Ireland 7
GDP ............. 3.91 7.28 5.84 10.14 9.87
Labor hours ...... − .10 3.20 1.67 6.24 5.79
Capitalstock...... 2.58 2.97 2.28 4.34 4.74
Labor share ....... .76 .68 .70 .64 .63
Netherlands 8
GDP ............. 2.00 3.02 2.66 3.75 3.65
Labor hours ...... − 1.35 1.02 − .24 3.55 3.31
Capitalstock...... 1.66 2.29 2.08 2.70 2.78
Labor share ....... .61 .60 .61 .60 .60
Norway
GDP ............. 1.17 2.84 2.10 4.33 3.15
Labor hours ...... − .26 .14 − 1.03 2.48 1.73
Capitalstock...... 3.02 1.66 1.05 2.87 2.69
Labor share ....... .72 .68 .67 .68 .69
Spain 9
GDP ............. 2.70 2.31 1.67 3.57 3.69
Labor hours ...... − 1.10 .38 − .86 2.86 3.34
Capitalstock...... 5.63 4.27 4.47 3.87 4.00
Labor share ....... .67 .61 .62 .60 .60
Sweden
GDP ............. 2.43 1.63 1.21 2.47 2.93
Labor hours ...... .90 − .42 − .88 .51 1.19
Capitalstock...... 2.93 2.24 2.10 2.51 n.a.
Labor share ....... .69 .68 .68 .68 .68
Switzerland10
GDP ............. 1.93 .82 .46 1.52 1.52
Labor hours ...... n.a. − .86 − .88 − .81 − .35
Capitalstock...... 3.58 3.18 3.30 2.94 3.04
Labor share ....... .67 .69 .69 .70 .69
4. Data for Belgium’s growth of labor hours start in 1984.
5. Data for Denmark’s growth of labor hours start in 1984, and data for
capital-stock growth start in 1988.
6. Data for Finland’s growth of capital stock start in 1994.
7. Data for Ireland’s growth of labor hours start in 1984.
8. Data for the Netherland’s labor share start in 1987.
9. Data for Spain’s growth of capital stock start in 1989.
10. Data for Switzerland’s growth of labor hours start in 1991.
n.a. Not available.
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gated data to construct such a measure.11
Among foreign industrial countries, only ﬁve have
growth rates of capital during 1996–98 that, as in the
United States, exceeded their own 1981–95 averages:
Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom. Canada, Norway, and Sweden
experienced a pickup in capital growth in the late
1990s relative to the early 1990s, but not relative to
the 1980s. Capital growth declined in 1996–98 rela-
tive to the earlier periods for Japan, France, Spain,
and Switzerland; for Italy and Belgium, capital
growth was relatively unchanged.
Factor Shares in Compensation
Even after data on labor and capital have been com-
piled, the problem remains of weighting their sepa-
rate contributions so that a single aggregate measure
of productive inputs can be estimated, thereby allow-
ing for the calculation of multifactor productivity.
Here we follow the general practice of setting these
weights equal to the share of the value of production
received by each factor as compensation for its ser-
vices. Labor’s share is calculated as the fraction of
the value of GDP in the business sector that is paid
to workers in that sector in the form of compensation;
the share for capital is constructed as one minus the
share for labor.
For the United States, labor’s share (compensation)
in the business sector has been roughly two-thirds of
the value of production for the past two decades
regardless of the source of data (table 1); other coun-
tries exhibit labor shares that are rather similar to that
of the United States. The exception is Japan, where
the share has exceeded 70 percent for the past twenty
years. For France, Denmark, Spain, and Ireland, the
labor share has shown a marked tendency to decline
over time.
Trends in Labor and Multifactor Productivity
Growth
Labor Productivity
For the United States, the average annual growth rate
of U.S. labor productivity over 1996–98 based on
BLS data was 2.4 percent, compared with 1.5 percent
for 1990–95 and 1.6 percent for the 1980s (table 2).
This pickup in U.S. labor productivity growth is
evident in the OECD data as well. Speciﬁcally, the
average annual growth rate of U.S. labor productivity
was 2.3 percent in 1996–98, compared with 1.0 per-
cent for the 1990–95 period and 1.3 percent for the
1980s.
Only two of the foreign industrial economies in
our sample, Australia and Switzerland, show a rise
in labor productivity growth over 1996–98 compared
with the earlier periods. For Australia, the accelera-
tion in labor productivity was particularly strong: an
increase of 2 percentage points in 1996–98 over its
average in the 1980s. In contrast, labor productivity
growth slowed in Canada, Japan, and the major Euro-
pean countries in the latter half of the 1990s rela-
tive to both the 1981–89 and the 1990–95 periods. In
most smaller European countries, such as Belgium,
Denmark, and the Netherlands, labor productivity
also decelerated in the latter half of the 1990s relative
to the two earlier periods. In a few countries, includ-
ing Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, labor productivity
growth was relatively unchanged in the most recent
period compared with the earlier periods.
On the whole, table 2 shows that, based on OECD
data, during the 1980s and the ﬁrst half of the 1990s,
U.S. labor productivity growth was below labor pro-
ductivity growth in every foreign Group of Seven
(G-7) country. However, in the latter half of the
1990s, the situation reversed: Labor productivity
growth in the United States was higher than that in
foreign G-7 countries. Furthermore, of the foreign
countries included in table 2, only Australia, Finland,
Ireland, and Switzerland had a higher rate of labor
productivity growth than the United States in the
1996–98 period.
Capital Deepening and Multifactor Productivity
As noted earlier, the growth of labor productivity
depends on both the rate of capital deepening and the
growth of multifactor productivity. For most coun-
tries, recent movements in the rate of capital deepen-
ing have been in the same direction as movements
in labor productivity growth. For the United States,
capital deepening rose in the latter half of the 1990s
relative to the 1981–95 period regardless of data
source. However, the contribution of U.S. capital
deepening is signiﬁcantly higher with BLS data than
with OECD data because of differences in the mea-
sures of capital growth drawn from these data
sources, as shown in table 1. Unlike the U.S. experi-
11. One study, discussed later in this article, that does construct
a measure of capital, using the same methodology as the BLS, for the
G-7 countries is Schreyer, ‘‘The Contribution of Information and
Communication Technology to Output Growth.’’ A drawback to his
series is that they extend only to 1996.
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slowed in 1996–98 compared with 1981–95. The
slowdown was particularly sharp in Ireland, the Neth-
erlands, and Spain, and somewhat more moderate in
Canada, France, and Germany. A notable exception
to the slowing of capital deepening abroad was
Australia.
The results for multifactor productivity growth are
also consistent with the pattern of labor productivity
growth. The results using the BLS-based data show a
pickup in U.S. multifactor productivity growth from
around 0.8 percent in the 1981–95 period to close to
1.5 percent in 1996–98. The OECD data also show
a pickup in U.S. multifactor productivity growth,
from around 1.0 percent in the 1981–95 period to
close to 1.9 percent in 1996–98. The difference in esti-
mated multifactor productivity growth rates for the
United States stems from the differences in estimated
growth rates of capital deepening in the two U.S. data
sources; with labor productivity growth about the
same in the two data sets, the higher rate of capital
deepening in the more conceptually accurate BLS
data, compared with the OECD data, leads to a lower
estimated rate of multifactor productivity growth.
2. Average growth rate of productivity estimates,






1981–89 1990–98 1990–95 1996–98 1996–991
United States
BLS data 2
Labor productivity .... 1.59 1.78 1.47 2.42 2.57
Capital deepening .. .73 .77 .68 .96 1.11
MFP .............. .86 1.01 .79 1.46 1.47
Of which labor
quality ...... .34 .39 .42 .32 .31
OECD data
Labor productivity .... 1.31 1.43 1.02 2.26 2.30
Capital deepening .. .25 .24 .16 .40 .54
MFP .............. 1.09 1.20 .85 1.91 1.80
Canada
Labor productivity .... 1.42 1.26 1.34 1.10 .92
Capital deepening .. 1.31 .96 1.08 .73 .67
MFP .............. .14 .31 .26 .39 .27
France
Labor productivity .... 3.41 2.12 2.26 1.86 1.61
Capital deepening .. 1.10 1.09 1.35 .57 .50
MFP .............. 2.26 1.03 .89 1.31 1.12
Germany 3
Labor productivity .... n.a. 2.13 2.26 1.96 2.14
Capital deepening .. n.a. 1.09 1.22 .91 1.06
MFP .............. n.a. 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.07
Italy
Labor productivity .... 2.33 2.09 2.72 .81 .67
Capital deepening .. .87 1.18 1.36 .82 .82
MFP .............. 1.45 .88 1.32 − .01 − .14
Japan
Labor productivity .... 3.12 2.48 2.89 1.64 2.07
Capital deepening .. 1.15 1.44 1.56 1.21 1.23
MFP............... 2.00 1.03 1.31 .46 .85
United Kingdom
Labor productivity .... 3.37 1.72 1.78 1.60 1.47
Capital deepening .. .42 .53 .57 .44 .54
MFP .............. 2.90 1.20 1.21 1.18 .95
Australia
Labor productivity .... 1.45 2.37 1.79 3.52 3.12
Capital deepening .. .45 .82 .64 1.16 1.06
MFP .............. 1.01 1.57 1.15 2.41 2.11
Note. The sum of capital deepening growth and multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth does not always add up to labor productivity growth because of
rounding errors.
1. Uses authors’ estimates for labor hours in 1999 for OECD data.
2. Measures of labor productivity, capital deepening, and MFP reported here
are those in Oliner and Sichel, ‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s,’’
plus their estimated growth of labor quality.
3. Calculations for Germany use growth rates starting in 1992 to avoid the






1981–89 1990–98 1990–95 1996–98 1996–991
Belgium 4
Labor productivity .... 2.32 1.90 2.18 1.35 1.05
Capital deepening .. .82 1.06 1.28 .63 .60
MFP .............. 1.51 .83 .87 .73 .46
Denmark 5
Labor productivity .... 2.53 2.67 3.69 .62 .86
Capital deepening .. n.a. .94 1.27 .27 .56
MFP .............. n.a. 1.70 2.37 .37 .31
Finland 6
Labor productivity .... 3.85 3.82 3.91 3.66 3.10
Capital deepening .. n.a. n.a. n.a. − .54 − .53
MFP .............. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.28 3.70
Ireland 7
Labor productivity .... 5.14 4.01 4.10 3.81 3.96
Capital deepening .. n.a. − .14 .15 − .71 − .39
MFP .............. n.a. 4.22 4.01 4.62 4.47
Netherlands 8
Labor productivity .... 3.40 2.07 2.98 .23 .35
Capital deepening .. n.a. .49 .90 − .33 − .21
MFP .............. n.a. 1.51 1.99 .54 .55
Norway
Labor productivity .... 1.44 2.72 3.18 1.80 1.39
Capital deepening .. .92 .48 .66 .12 .29
MFP .............. .50 2.23 2.48 1.73 1.13
Spain 9
Labor productivity .... 3.89 1.96 2.58 .70 .34
Capital deepening .. n.a. 1.48 2.01 .40 .26
MFP .............. n.a. .45 .52 .31 .08
Sweden
Labor productivity .... 1.52 2.06 2.11 1.96 1.73
Capital deepening .. .61 .81 .89 .65 n.a.
MFP .............. .92 1.23 1.19 1.32 n.a.
Switzerland10
Labor productivity .... n.a. 1.31 .66 2.38 1.90
Capital deepening .. n.a. 1.18 1.21 1.13 1.03
MFP .............. n.a. .10 − .57 1.20 .84
4. Data for Belgium’s growth of labor hours start in 1984.
5. Data for Denmark’s growth of labor hours start in 1984, and data for
capital-stock growth start in 1988.
6. Data for Finland’s growth of capital stock start in 1994.
7. Data for Ireland’s growth of labor hours start in 1984.
8. Data for the Netherland’s labor share start in 1987.
9. Data for Spain’s growth of capital stock start in 1989.
10. Data for Switzerland’s growth of labor hours start in 1991.
n.a. Not available.
Productivity Developments Abroad 671In contrast to the results for the United States,
most of the foreign G-7 countries—the exception is
Canada—experienced slowing multifactor productiv-
ity growth in the latter half of the 1990s relative to
the 1981–95 period. Multifactor productivity growth
also slowed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Both Australia and Sweden experienced an accelera-
tion in multifactor productivity, with the Australian
pickup particularly sharp.
An important question is which component—
capital deepening or multifactor productivity—was
the driving force behind the 1.0 percentage point
acceleration in U.S. labor productivity recorded in the
BLS-based data from 1990–95 to 1996–98. Table 2
shows that in the BLS data, capital deepening
accounts for 0.3 percentage point and that multifactor
productivity accounts for 0.7 percentage point.12 The
12. As indicated earlier, the recent annual revision of the U.S.
national account implies a little more capital deepening than reported
OECD data yield comparable results, although these
data do not embody quality adjustments for capital to
the same extent as the BLS data.
Among the foreign industrial countries, the results
indicate that changes in the growth rate of labor
productivity have been dominated, for the most part,
by changes in the growth rate of multifactor produc-
tivity. The exceptions to this pattern are Belgium,
Canada, and Spain, where movements in the growth
rate of capital deepening are important for explaining
changes in the growth of labor productivity. Changes
in multifactor productivity growth rates thus appear
to have played the preeminent role in accounting for
divergences in the movements of growth in U.S. and
foreign labor productivity.
by Oliner and Sichel. Also, the above estimate of the change of
multifactor productivity growth includes the change in the growth rate
of labor quality over these two periods, which was − 0.1 percent.
1. Growth rates of labor productivity in the Group of Seven and other OECD countries, 1981–99































































Note. Calculations for the United States use the OECD data; results for
Germany use growth rates starting in 1992 to avoid the distortions induced by
the German uniﬁcation during 1990–91. Calculations for growth rates (actual)
for Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland start in 1984.
672 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 2000Sensitivity to Period Selection
In an examination of the data in table 2, one question
that comes to mind is whether movements in mea-
sured average productivity growth from period to
period accurately reﬂect underlying movements in
productivity performance or, alternatively, reﬂect
largely the choice of time periods used to make
the average growth rate calculations. Chart 1 shows
annual growth rates for labor productivity for the
countries in our study. For some countries, year-to-
year movements in labor productivity are extremely
volatile, a fact that is masked by period averages.
This fact further supports the possibility that period
averages of growth rates may not appropriately
characterize underlying trends in productivity
performance.
Even so, in the United States it is clear that the
recent surge in measured productivity growth did not
occur until the mid-1990s (for both BLS and OECD
data) and since then has remained consistently high.
Hence, a focus on 1996–98 as the period when pro-
ductivity performance broke with its prior historical
trend certainly makes sense for the United States.13
For many of the foreign economies shown in
chart 1, 1995 does not represent a comparable break
date in productivity performance. Thus, the question
arises whether the improved performance of mea-
sured U.S. productivity growth relative to that of
foreign economies might not be merely an artifact of
the periods chosen to calculate the growth compari-
sons. To put it another way, if an alternative year
13. One motivation to use 1995 as the cut-off date for comparisons
is the abrupt change in the rate of decline in prices for computer and
peripheral equipment: from an annual average rate of 15 percent over
1990–95 to 30 percent over 1995–98; see Robert Gordon’s article
‘‘Not Much of a New Economy,’’ in the Financial Times, July 26,
2000. This abrupt change in price declines is credited with accelerat-
ing the pace of adoption of computers and the increased growth rate
of labor productivity; see the interview with Dale Jorgenson in Steve
Liesman, ‘‘Further Gains in Productivity Are Predicted—Economists
Say Study Has Made Them Believers in the New Economy,’’ Wall
Street Journal, August 1, 2000.
1.—Continued
































































Productivity Developments Abroad 673were chosen as a potential break date in productivity
performance—say, 1993, so that productivity growth
in 1994–99 would be compared with growth in
1980–93—might not a step-up in productivity growth
be discerned for many foreign industrial countries as
well?
In fact, a closer look at chart 1 fails to support this
hypothesis. To abstract somewhat from year-to-year
movements in productivity growth, a four-year mov-
ing average of productivity growth (which includes
the current and three previous years) is also shown
for each of the countries in this chart. These series
make clear that for most foreign industrial countries,
it is impossible to identify a point at which the
moving averages started moving up on a sustained
basis—that is, a break date in the past decade such
that productivity growth after that date is discernibly
higher than growth before that date.14 Overall, our
failure to discern a pickup of productivity growth
in most foreign industrial countries does not appear
to be an artifact of the periods chosen to calculate
productivity.
The conclusions reached from table 2 and chart 1
raise two questions. First, what accounts for the fail-
ure of productivity growth abroad to rise, especially
given the pickup in U.S. productivity growth? (In
fact, in some countries, productivity growth seems to
be trending down.) Second, is this divergent perfor-
mance likely to be sustained? Although no deﬁnitive
answers to these questions exist, the following sec-
tions survey the range of available evidence and
explanations.
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH
To account for the recent divergence in the patterns
of U.S. and foreign labor productivity growth, we
group the existing hypotheses into three categories:
cyclical, methodological, and structural.
Cyclical Considerations
One of the factors that is considered important in
explaining productivity growth is the cyclical posi-
tion of the economy. With the U.S. economy grow-
ing rapidly in recent years while foreign industrial
economies have generally been growing more slowly,
it is possible that some part of the divergence in
productivity performance may be attributable to dif-
ferences in cyclical positions.
One way that a cyclical pickup in activity may lead
to a corresponding uptick in productivity involves
‘‘factor hoarding.’’ This phenomenon arises from
ﬁrms’ tendency to adjust the intensity with which
labor and capital are used before adjusting the num-
ber of workers or machines. During recessions, ﬁrms
may choose not to lay off workers or reduce their
hours to an extent commensurate with reduced pro-
duction schedules; this unwillingness to lay off work-
ers is referred to as ‘‘labor hoarding.’’ In conse-
quence, output may decline by more than labor hours
during recessions, as (unobservable) labor effort falls,
leading to declines in measured labor productivity.
Conversely, during subsequent recoveries, output has
a tendency to rise more than labor hours as employ-
ees work harder, thereby boosting measured labor
productivity.
Similarly, a ﬁrm may choose to decrease the num-
ber of hours or the speed at which it uses a particular
piece of equipment during a period of economic
slack. As a result, the measured capital input will
tend to fall less than the effective use of the capital
stock, which will depress measures of multifactor
productivity growth, while the reverse holds true
during economic recoveries. Thus one would like to
use a measure of the capital inputs that would adjust
for rates of capacity utilization. The best measures of
capacity utilization are available for the manufactur-
ing sector, but these are not, unfortunately, suitable
for use in this analysis. By deﬁnition, business sector
capital includes the capital of ﬁrms in the service
sector, a sector that makes up a large share of activity
in most industrialized countries and for which data on
capacity utilization are not available.
To examine the role of cyclical considerations
in the determination of labor productivity growth,
we review the four-year moving averages of growth
rates of labor productivity shown in chart 1. Although
such moving averages do not necessarily correspond
to trends in labor productivity adjusted for cyclical
inﬂuences, they do make it easier to identify visually
a long-term trend in the underlying series, with
cyclical inﬂuences minimized.15 Trends in labor pro-
ductivity growth in many foreign industrial countries
during 1996–99 appear to be a continuation of ongo-
ing downward trends rather than the result of cyclical
inﬂuences.
Speciﬁcally, as shown in chart 1, the countries with
a relatively long-term decline in labor productivity
14. The one exception to this pattern is Australia, where productiv-
ity growth picked up in the early 1990s.
15. We considered the robustness of our ﬁndings by computing
trend productivity growth using a Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter; the con-
clusions are robust to this alternative method.
674 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 2000growth are France, the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, and Spain. For other countries, such as Italy,
Japan, Belgium, Finland, and Norway, the decline in
trend productivity growth started in the early 1990s,
whereas Canada, Ireland, and Sweden showed a
relatively unchanged level of productivity growth.
Australia is the only foreign country in our sample
that showed a rising trend in productivity growth,
an observation that conﬁrms the results shown in
table 2. Because the trend has been rising since the
early 1990s, it suggests that factors other than the
business cycle have been important.16
The pickup in labor productivity growth in the
United States may be due in part to cyclical factors,
but chart 1 suggests that the increase of U.S. labor
productivity growth relative to foreign growth, as
shown in table 2, is not due solely to cyclical factors.
Nevertheless, not enough time has elapsed to allow a
ﬁrm judgment as to whether the recent divergence in
U.S. and foreign productivity performance reﬂects a
secular shift.
Methodological Considerations
The much stronger measured productivity perfor-
mance in the United States relative to the foreign
countries in recent years does not reﬂect only the
more conceptually accurate statistics embodied in the
BLS data set (table 2). Even based on the OECD data
set, measured productivity growth moves up appre-
ciably in the United States in recent years. Neverthe-
less, despite the efforts of the OECD to enhance
cross-country comparability of measures of output
and input, methodological differences in national
statistical agencies could still play a role in compari-
sons of the movements of U.S. and foreign productiv-
ity growth. Two methodological considerations that
affect our measures of productivity growth are the
method for measuring quality change in price indexes
and the evolution of the system of national accounts.
Quality Change and Price Measurement
Calculations of capital deepening and multifactor
productivity growth depend on measures of real out-
put and of real capital. Because the data used to
estimate output and investment are collected on a
nominal basis, price indexes must be calculated to
deﬂate these nominal ﬁgures to a real (constant-price)
basis. This adjustment can be difﬁcult when changes
in prices reﬂect changes in quality. One method for
measuring quality change in prices is to use hedonic
pricing. This method seeks to identify the quality
component of a product’s price by redeﬁning goods
according to their characteristics and computing a
quality-adjusted price based on those characteristics.
For example, for computers, hedonic pricing derives
a price for a bundle of computing power from the
observed price of a computer ‘‘box’’ by estimating a
relationship between the observed price and charac-
teristics such as processor speed and memory size.
With the rapid advancement in product development
and quality change in high-tech goods, hedonic price
indexes have gained increasing, albeit still limited,
use among industrial countries (table 3).
Countries that do not use hedonic price indexes for
goods such as computers, whose quality has changed
rapidly over time, tend to understate output growth
for these goods. If the price of a good reﬂects a
quality improvement and is not quality adjusted, then
the price change will be overstated and the output
change understated. As a result, labor productivity
growth will tend to be understated for countries that
do not use hedonic price indexes relative to those
countries that do make these quality adjustments.
Because both the change in output and the change in
the capital stock will be understated for countries that
do not make this type of quality adjustment, the effect
on multifactor productivity of using hedonic price
indexes is less clear to the extent that computers are
both an output and a capital input.
Can the failure of many foreign countries to use
hedonic price indexes for computer products explain
the relatively lower measured productivity perfor-
mance abroad? Probably not. First, many of the coun-
tries that do use hedonic indexes, including Denmark,
France, and Japan, still show declines in productivity
growth. Second, in many of the countries that do not
employ hedonic indexes, including Germany and
Italy, a relatively small fraction of their output
is composed of computers and other products related
to information technology. Furthermore, other meth-
odological differences between the United States and
many foreign industrial countries, such as the use in
the United States of chain-weighted instead of ﬁxed-
weight price indexes (table 3), may offset, to some
extent, the effect of not using hedonic price indexes.
16. For a detailed discussion of Australia’s productivity perfor-
mance, see David Gruen and Glenn Stevens, ‘‘Australian Macro-
economic Performance in the 1990s,’’ Reserve Bank of Australia
Working Paper (July 2000). They argue that Australia’s good perfor-
mance in the 1990s is due to deregulation and privatization of ‘‘old
economy’’ sectors rather than to advances in the information technol-
ogy sector.
Productivity Developments Abroad 675Evolution of National Income Accounting Systems
International comparisons of productivity are also
affected by the ongoing transition from the 1968
System of National Accounts (SNA68) to the 1993
System of National Accounts (SNA93), developed
under the auspices of the United Nations, and from
the 1979 European System of National Accounts
(ESA79) to the 1995 system (ESA95).17 The changes
to national accounts introduced by these new systems
are fairly substantial and include broadening the con-
cept of investment to include expenditures such as
software and mineral exploration, reclassifying some
social expenditures as government consumption
instead of private consumption, and providing a more
comprehensive treatment of the ﬁnancial services
sector. In addition, both SNA93 and ESA95 recom-
mend greater use of chain-weighted price indexes.
The changeover to the new systems ultimately will
lead to greater international comparability of produc-
tivity measures. At present, however, our measures of
productivity are complicated by the changeover, not
only across countries but also over time for some
countries, because implementation has been gradual
and is not uniform. In a number of countries, the
changes required by the new system have been imple-
mented only over a short range of historical data and
represent only preliminary estimates of the national
accounts on the new basis. Table 3 shows the current
national accounting system used in many countries
and also lists the starting dates for which the data
became available on the new basis for these coun-
tries. Some countries, such as Sweden and Spain,
have published data in terms of the new accounts
system only for the latter portion of our sample,
while other countries have made these data available
for the full sample period (1980–99). For those coun-
tries that have revised data only for the latter part of
the sample, the early part of the sample is based on
the old national accounts system, SNA68 or ESA79.
For each country, the switch to the new accounting
system raises both the level and growth rates of GDP
relative to the old accounting system. The quantita-
tive effect varies from country to country, with the
OECD estimating that, relative to the old system, the
new accounting system raises the level of GDP
in 1996 from as little as 0.3 percent in Belgium to
as much as 5.1 percent in Denmark. Therefore, in a
country such as Denmark, where the changeover to
the new accounting system occurred in 1988, the
effect of this change will tend to raise output growth
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Other countries
where the changeover affects our data in the middle
of the sample include Italy, Finland, and Sweden. For
these countries, labor productivity growth will tend
to be biased down in the 1980s relative to the
17. The 1995 European System of National Accounts (ESA95) is
designed to be consistent with SNA93 and is used by European Union
member states. It further enhances the comparability of national
account data among members of the European Union.
3. Features of national accounts in the Group of Seven
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Accounts; and ESA95, to the 1995 European System of National Accounts.
1. Hedonic price index used for microcomputers only.
2. Uses current U.S. hedonic index, exchange-rate adjusted.
Source. OECD and national statistical agencies.
676 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 20001990s simply because of the transition to the new
accounting system.18
Therefore, in countries most affected by this tran-
sition, labor productivity growth may be artiﬁcially
low in the early part of our sample, a result that may
bias our estimates toward showing an acceleration
in labor productivity. Thus, the switchovers to new
national accounting methods do not help to account
for the absence of an upswing in recorded foreign
productivity growth.
Structural Considerations
If the failure of foreign productivity growth to pick
up in a manner commensurate with the recent rise
in U.S. productivity growth cannot be wholly attrib-
uted to either measurement or cyclical factors, then
part of the divergence in performance may be struc-
tural in origin. Accordingly, this divergence may
have its roots in more fundamental economic forces.
Two important structural factors affecting move-
ments in U.S. and foreign productivity growth rates
are changes in the quality of the labor force—as
reﬂected in the skills, educational attainment, and
demographic characteristics of workers—and the
sluggishness of the rest of the world, relative to the
United States, in adopting recent innovations in infor-
mation technology.
Labor Quality
To examine the role played by changes in the quality
of the labor force in the United States and abroad, we
examined data from a study undertaken at the OECD
by Scarpetta, Bassinini, Pilat, and Schreyer, who
allow for change in average worker quality by using
data on wages and employment for laborers with
different educational levels.19 Chart 2 shows the
growth rate of their labor input measure for thirteen
of the countries in this study for the 1986–98 period,
including a breakdown of growth in labor input into
hours growth and the change in quality of labor. As
shown in the chart, changes in labor quality have
generally been a much more important component of
labor productivity growth abroad than in the United
States.
In fact, although the data in chart 2 do not distin-
guish between changes in labor quality in different
periods, the OECD study reports that growth of U.S.
labor quality remained relatively stable throughout
the 1981–98 period.20 The results suggest that a
pickup in labor quality growth was not an important
18. The bias to our multifactor productivity estimates for these
countries is less clear because their capital stock growth as well as
their output growth in the 1980s will be understated.
19. See ‘‘Economic Growth in the OECD Area.’’
20. Ibid.
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Source. Stefano Scarpetta, Andrea Bassanini, Dirk Pilat, and Paul Schreyer,
‘‘Economic Growth in the OECD Area: Recent Trends at the Aggregate and
Sectoral Level,’’ OECD Economics Department Working Paper, no. 248.
Productivity Developments Abroad 677factor in explaining the acceleration in U.S. produc-
tivity. This ﬁnding is consistent with the evidence
based on BLS data from table 2 that show little
change in the growth rate of labor quality during the
past two decades.
However, in some European countries, such as
France and Italy, a slowdown in the growth of labor
skills does appear to partially explain the slowdown
in productivity growth.21 In particular, the OECD
study reports that, once an adjustment has been made
for labor quality, trend multifactor productivity
growth in France and Italy picks up in the latter half
of the 1990s relative to the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
However, even after one adjusts for labor quality, the
estimates of trend multifactor productivity growth in
France and Italy in the latter half of the 1990s are still
lower than the estimates of multifactor productivity
growth in the 1980s. In sum, unmeasured changes
in labor quality do not appear to account for most
of the divergences in U.S. and foreign productivity
performance in recent years.
Diffusion of Technology
A second hypothesis explaining why foreign pro-
ductivity growth has not risen as much as U.S. pro-
ductivity growth is the slower pace with which
foreign countries have adopted recent innovations
in information technology (IT). Researchers have
focused on three channels by which those innova-
tions may increase productivity growth. The ﬁrst
channel is the contribution that IT industries make
toward productivity growth through heightened pro-
ductivity performance in the production of IT goods,
such as computers, software, and other high-tech
equipment. Even though these industries generally
contribute only a small fraction of total production,
they may make a large contribution to overall produc-
tivity growth if there are strong productivity gains in
these industries. For example, Oliner and Sichel esti-
mate that, although the computer and semiconductor
sectors’ share of total output in the nonfarm business
sector is only about 21⁄2 percent in the United States
for 1996–99, these sectors accounted for about half
of their estimate of multifactor productivity growth
from 1996 to 1999.22
21. One possible explanation for this slowdown in labor quality in
some European countries is that in the 1980s and the 1990s, declines
in hours worked in these countries (see table 1) fell particularly hard
on low-skilled workers. This trend tended to boost the average quality
of a worker in those years. In more recent years, with labor market
conditions improving, the utilization of low-skilled workers has
increased, thereby slowing labor quality growth.
22. Oliner and Sichel also estimate that these sectors contributed
0.35 percentage point to an acceleration of roughly 1 percentage point
Comparable data on the computer and semicon-
ductor industries do not exist for many foreign indus-
trial countries. Instead, we examine production of IT
goods, which include data processing equipment,
telecommunications equipment, and consumer elec-
tronics, relative to total output for the seventeen
countries in this study. In 1997, Ireland, Japan, Fin-
land, and Sweden were the only countries with IT
production shares that were greater than that of the
United States (chart 3). High IT production shares in
Finland and Ireland are consistent with their rela-
tively fast multifactor productivity growth and may
partially explain it, although neither Finland nor
Ireland has experienced a sizable acceleration in
multifactor productivity in recent years. Low multi-
factor productivity growth in Denmark and Spain is
consistent with these countries’ relatively low level
of IT production.
The other two channels relate to the use of infor-
mation technology in other sectors of the economy.
Investment in IT goods can boost the capital–labor
ratio and therefore raise labor productivity. In recent
years, with the price of IT goods falling rapidly as a
result of technological improvements, investment in
IT equipment has been increasing rapidly relative to
investment in other types of capital. Finally, informa-
tion technologies, such as Internet-ready computers,
may create network effects that spur the dissemina-
tion of information, resulting in disembodied techni-
cal change.
Investment in information technology abroad does
not appear to have translated into higher productivity
growth through these two channels as much as in the
United States. One reason is that, compared with the
United States, foreign investment in information tech-
nology has been a smaller share of foreign economies
than of the U.S. economy, so that the payoffs to
information technology in terms of improved produc-
tivity growth have yet to show up.
As evidence of this possibility, table 4 displays
data from Schreyer on several measures of the IT
sector in the G-7 economies.23 From this table, one
in the annual growth rate of labor productivity from 1991–95 to
1996–99. See Oliner and Sichel, ‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the
1990s.’’ Other studies that have also found a signiﬁcant contribution
to the acceleration in labor productivity growth from the production
of computer hardware include Gordon, ‘‘Does the ‘New Economy’
Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?’’; Jorgenson and
Stiroh, ‘‘Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in the
Information Age;’’ Karl Whelan, ‘‘Computers, Obsolescence, and
Productivity,’’ Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-06
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 2000);
and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President
(February 2000).
23. See Schreyer, ‘‘The Contribution of Information and Communi-
cation Technology to Output Growth.’’
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residential gross ﬁxed capital formation has been
increasing in all of the G-7 countries as producers
substitute IT equipment for other types of investment
goods. As a result, information technology’s share of
the total nominal capital stock has increased in all of
these countries, with the United States, at 7.4 percent,
having the highest share of IT capital in 1996 and
Italy, at 2.1 percent, the lowest. With IT equipment
making up a larger share of total capital, it is not
surprising that information technology’s share of
total income in the United States is also higher than
in the other G-7 countries. As a result, IT equipment
makes a larger contribution to output growth in the
United States than in the other G-7 countries.24
Finally, Schreyer’s study also reports that the con-
tribution of IT capital to output growth is somewhat
higher in the United Kingdom and Canada than it is
24. Schreyer’s analysis probably understates the contribution of
information technology to growth in all countries because his deﬁni-
tion of IT equipment does not include software.
4. Share and contribution of information technology in the Group of Seven countries, 1985, 1990, and 1996
Percent except as noted
IT measures United
States Canada France Western
Germany Italy Japan United
Kingdom
Share of IT
In nonresidential gross ﬁxed capital formation
1985 ............................................. 12.1 11.1 10.1 7.1 5.8 4.2 10.4
1990 ............................................. 15.7 12.6 8.8 7.2 7.7 5.3 13.3
1996 ............................................. 19.9 16.2 10.9 10.9 9.6 8.1 18.3
In nominal productive capital stock
1985 ............................................. 6.2 4.3 2.4 2.9 1.3 1.2 3.6
1996 ............................................. 7.4 5.0 3.2 3.0 2.1 2.3 5.2
In total income
1985 ............................................. .8 .7 .3 .3 .5 .5 .4
1990 ............................................. 1.3 1.4 .9 .7 .8 .7 1.0
1996 ............................................. 1.7 1.5 .9 .8 .9 .8 1.5
Contributions to output growth (percentage points)
from IT equipment
1980–85 ............................................ .28 .25 .17 .12 .13 .11 .16
1985–90 ............................................ .34 .31 .23 .17 .18 .17 .27
1990–96 ............................................ .42 .28 .17 .19 .21 .19. .29
Source. Paul Schreyer, ‘‘The Contribution of Information and Communi-
cation Technology to Output Growth: A Study of the G-7 Countries,’’ OECD
Science, Technology, and Industry Working Paper, 2000/2 (OECD, 2000).
3. Production of information technology goods, selected countries, 1997






Note. IT goods include data processing equipment, telecommunications
equipment, and consumer electronics.
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Productivity Developments Abroad 679in France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This ﬁnding
also reﬂects information technology’s relatively low
share of total income in those countries.25
Unfortunately, Schreyer’s analysis does not extend
beyond 1996. It therefore does not include the latter
half of the 1990s, for which researchers such as
Oliner and Sichel have found that the use of informa-
tion technology as a capital input played a signiﬁcant
role in the pickup in labor productivity growth in
the United States.26 To present more recent evidence,
we examine the change in multifactor productivity
growth for selected OECD countries during 1981–95
and 1996–98 plotted against the number of Internet
hosts (chart 4) and also against the number of secure
servers (chart 5), which is a more relevant measure of
the extent of electronic commerce than the number of
Internet hosts.27 Using the median of the correspond-
ing variables as critical values, we can group the
25. Although the data on both IT production and investment are
consistent with a slower rate of innovation and adoption of informa-
tion technology abroad than in the United States, the reasons for this
development are not clear. One explanation is that, relative to foreign
countries, several institutional features of the United States are more
hospitable to innovation and adoption of these technologies. Such
features include the regulatory environment, the ﬂexibility of the labor
force, and the breadth and depth of ﬁnancial markets. For a more
detailed discussion of these features, see Roger Ferguson, ‘‘Is Informa-
tion Technology the Key to Higher Productivity Growth in the United
States and Abroad?’’ (remarks before the 2000 Global Economic
and Investment Outlook Conference, Carnegie Bosch Institute,
Pittsburgh, Pa., September 21, 1999), available on line at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990921.htm.
26. See Oliner and Sichel, ‘‘The Resurgence of Growth in the Late
1990s.’’
27. We used the following deﬁnitions of an Internet host and a
server:
On the Internet, the term ‘‘host’’ means any computer that has
full two-way access to other computers on the Internet. A host
has a speciﬁc ‘‘local or host number’’ that, together with the
observations into four quadrants. The countries that
are in the northeast quadrant in both charts are Can-
ada, Norway, Sweden, and the United States—
countries in which a relatively large improvement in
multifactor productivity growth has been accompa-
nied by a substantial proliferation of information
technology. The countries in the southwest quadrant
include Japan, France, and Italy; in these countries
the declines in multifactor productivity growth have
been accompanied by a more limited diffusion of
information technology.
SUSTAINED VERSUS TRANSITORY GROWTH
DIFFERENTIALS
An important question raised by the estimated differ-
ential between U.S. and foreign productivity growth
rates is how long it will be sustained. Even if the
higher measured productivity growth experienced in
network number, forms its unique IP address. If you use Point-to-
Point Protocol to get access to your access provider, you have a
unique IP address for the duration of any connection you make to
the Internet and your computer is a host for that period. In this
context, a ‘‘host’’ is a node in a network.
See whatis.com. On line. TechTarget.com, Inc. Available: http://
whatis.techtarget.com/WhatIs_Deﬁnition_Page/0,4152,212254,00.html
Oct. 21, 1999 [last update]
Speciﬁc to the Web, a Web server is the computer program
(housed in a computer) that serves requested HTML pages or
ﬁles. A Web client is the requesting program associated with the
user. The Web browser in your computer is a client that requests
HTML ﬁles from Web servers.
See whatis.com. On line. TechTarget.com, Inc. Available: http://
whatis.techtarget.com/WhatIs_Deﬁnition_Page/0,4152,212964,00.html
Nov. 29, 1999 [last update].
4. Acceleration in multifactor productivity in relation to the number of Internet hosts, selected countries
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1. Change in growth rates of multifactor productivity between 1981–95 and
1996–98.
Source. Number of Internet hosts from OECD Information Outlook 2000,
ﬁgure 2, p. 79.
680 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 2000the United States in recent years is attributable to
structural factors, rather than cyclical or methodologi-
cal considerations, this does not mean that U.S. pro-
ductivity growth will indeﬁnitely remain higher than
that in the rest of the world. In fact, there are reasons
to believe that the differential is likely to erode over
time.
First, to the extent that past experience is a useful
guide, these countries will likely exhibit a phenom-
enon known as convergence: Countries that are
behind in terms of their implementation of technolo-
gies can learn from countries that are more advanced
and increase their productivity more rapidly. As these
countries take advantage of new technologies and the
availability of unexploited returns to scale, productiv-
ity growth rates ﬁrst rise and then diminish over time.
Second, the U.S. experience and that of some other
countries suggests that the increasing use of informa-
tion technology has been an important part of a
pickup in multifactor productivity growth. For exam-
ple, Sweden, Norway, and Canada all tend to be
relatively intensive users of information technology,
and they seem to be starting to reap the beneﬁts of
this investment. Because investment in and use of
information technology is becoming increasingly
important, even in countries where structural impedi-
ments such as inﬂexible labor markets and a burden-
some regulatory environment are thought to inhibit
the adoption of new technologies, it is not unreason-
able to expect that IT investments will help boost
productivity growth abroad in the future.
CONCLUSION
We have documented that a pickup in productivity
growth such as occurred in the United States in the
second half of the 1990s, measured as either labor or
multifactor productivity growth, does not appear to
have occurred in most foreign industrial countries. In
fact, in many foreign industrialized economies, mea-
sured growth rates of labor and multifactor productiv-
ity actually declined during this period.
In the absence of more deﬁnitive answers, the
following explanations may be relevant as to why
foreign economies have not experienced the accele-
ration in productivity witnessed in the United States.
First, to some extent, recent U.S. productivity perfor-
mance may contain a cyclical element related to the
strength of the economy, compared with more muted
growth abroad, although this factor does not seem
to explain all the divergence in U.S. and foreign
productivity performance. Second, although it is
difﬁcult to determine the overall quantitative effect of
differences in measurement across countries, the evi-
dence suggests that measurement bias has, at most,
only a small role in accounting for the failure of
measured productivity growth to pick up abroad.
Finally, some of the upswing in U.S. productivity
growth compared with that abroad is likely due to
more fundamental changes in the U.S. economy,
reﬂecting more advanced diffusion of technological
improvements, especially in the IT sector, than has
occurred in most foreign industrialized countries.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect that the
differential will not be sustained indeﬁnitely. First,
the historical record suggests that productivity growth
has tended to converge among industrial countries.
Second, there is evidence that, although the diffusion
of information technology has not occurred as rapidly
abroad as in the United States, the proliferation of
these technologies is occurring there as well.
5. Acceleration in multifactor productivity in relation to the number of secure Internet servers, selected countries
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1. Change in growth rates of multifactor productivity between 1981–95 and
1996–98.
Source. Number of Internet servers from OECD Information Outlook 2000,
ﬁgure 3, p. 80.
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